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INTRODUCTION 
The Armed Career Criminal Act (hereinafter “ACCA”) provides for 
higher penalties if an offender has three previous convictions for a “violent 
felony.”1 In the immigration context, any alien, including a lawful permanent 
 
* J.D., May 2016, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law; Former Executive Editor, Journal 
of Criminal Law and Criminology. I would like to thank my editors, Jeffrey Wysong, Matthew 
Gordon and Dmitri Rizek, for their extraordinary editorial advice. Special thanks to Benjamin 
Mark Moss, J.D., American University Washington College of Law, 2010, for inspiration, 
editing, guidance, friendship and thoughtful feedback, all without which this comment would 
not have been published, as well as Judge Marjorie K. Allard, Alaska Court of Appeals, for 
her much-appreciated assistance. Finally, I would like to thank my wife for her unconditional 
love and support over the years. 
1 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). 
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resident, is deportable if he or she is convicted of an “aggravated felony.”2 
Both of these felony categories include state criminal convictions for the 
crimes that fall into these categories, like robbery, burglary, or arson.3 Not all 
state criminal statutes are the same, however, and the elements of a given 
crime can vary across jurisdictions.4 
This patchwork of definitions leads to some obvious difficulties for 
federal courts when it comes to determining whether an offender’s previous 
convictions fit into these “violent” or “aggravated” categories and are thus 
predicates for enhanced criminal penalties or removal.5 To help provide 
guidance in this area, the Supreme Court developed the “categorical 
approach,” which requires any state criminal statute to be identical to or 
narrower in scope than the generic version.6 There are times, however, where 
the elements of a state crime are written in a way that could criminalize two 
different courses of conduct, one that is a generic crime and one that is not. 
In these situations, the Supreme Court created the “modified categorical 
approach.”7 This approach allows a sentencing court, or an immigration 
judge, to look beyond the bare elements of the crime to a limited set of 
documents to determine whether the defendant or alien was convicted of the 
generic offense.8 
While these approaches (and when to use them) are simple enough to 
understand in the abstract, they are difficult to apply in practice, often leading 
to inconsistent results among the lower federal courts.9 Two recent Supreme 
Court cases, Descamps v. United States10 and Mathis v. United States,11 have 
attempted to resolve these issues in order to clarify when it is appropriate to 
use the modified approach while also giving clearer guidance to the lower 
courts. Yet, some questions and ambiguities still remain. 
Part I of this comment will explain the difference between indivisible 
and divisible statutes, which is the basis for this particular issue of statutory 
interpretation. This part will also explain the categorical and modified 
 
2 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). 
3 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e); Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 41 (2009). 
4 See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990). 
5 See Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2290 (2013); Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 41. 
6 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598. 
7 See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 17 (2005); Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. 
8 Shepard, 544 U.S. at 17; Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. 
9 See, e.g., United States v. Aguila-Montes De Oca, 655 F.3d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 2011) (en 
banc) (per curiam), abrogated by Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2286–92; United States v. Venzor-
Granillo, 668 F.3d 1224, 1231 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v. Fife, 624 F.3d 441, 446 (7th 
Cir. 2010); United States v. Martinez-Hernandez, 422 F.3d 1084, 1086 (10th Cir. 2005). 
10 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013). 
11 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016). 
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categorical approaches to statutory interpretation to illustrate why the 
Supreme Court created these categories and how they have evolved over 
time. Part II will examine the Court’s recent attempts to clarify and give 
guidance on these issues in Descamps and Mathis. Part III will discuss the 
issues that still remain after Mathis and what the Court could possibly do (and 
perhaps should do) next. 
I. BACKGROUND 
State criminal statutes can qualify as predicate offenses under federal 
law if the state criminal statute qualifies as a generic offense.12 State criminal 
statutes that correspond to a majority of state criminal codes roughly 
correspond with generic offenses.13 For example, the ACCA enhances 
sentences for defendants with three prior violent felony convictions.14 The 
statute defines a “violent felony” as a crime that is both punishable by a year 
of imprisonment and “is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of 
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential 
risk of physical injury to another.”15 To qualify for violent felony status, a 
state criminal statute must contain the roughly similar elements as the generic 
offense.16 
Complicating matters is that some statutes criminalize different types of 
conduct within the same section, so it is often unclear if the defendant was 
convicted of a generic offense. To determine whether a specific state criminal 
statute, written in the disjunctive, is a generic offense, the Supreme Court has 
created a two-step analysis: first, the sentencing court must determine if the 
offense is made up of a single set of “indivisible” elements, or if it has 
“divisible,” alternative elements. If the statute is indivisible, the court can 
only use the “categorical” approach, where the court evaluates only the 
elements of the conviction statute to see if it is a generic offense. If the statute 
is divisible, the court uses the “modified categorical” approach, where it can 
look to a limited set of documents from the earlier conviction to determine 
whether the statute is a generic offense. 
A. INDIVISIBLE V. DIVISIBLE STATUTES 
As noted above, indivisible statutes are statutes that require a single set 
of elements to be met in order to convict a defendant of a crime, and divisible 
 
12 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e); Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 41 (2009). 
13 Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990). 
14 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). 
15 Id. 
16 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598. 
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statutes provide that a defendant can be convicted of a crime without one or 
more elements being met. The majority of criminal statutes the federal courts 
must evaluate are written as indivisible, while divisible statutes are rare.17 
The distinction between the two statutes is best shown by example. 
Imagine a statute defining murder as “unlawful killing with intent to kill.”18 
This statute has three elements: (1) someone is killed by another’s actions; 
(2) the killing is unlawful (i.e., without justification or excuse); and (3) the 
actor intended to kill. An individual is then charged with shooting a gun at 
two people standing next to each other, killing one of them. 
Here, the first two elements of the hypothetical statute are met: someone 
was killed by another’s unlawful actions. As for the last element, two 
members of the jury could reasonably disagree who the defendant was aiming 
for. One juror thinks the defendant meant to shoot the victim while the other 
juror thinks the defendant meant to shoot the survivor and missed. In the end, 
this disagreement does not matter because both jurors agree that the shooter 
had the requisite intent as required by the element of the statute.19 The statute 
is indivisible because all elements need to be met for an individual to be 
guilty. 
For most state criminal statutes, when judges interpret them to see if 
they match a generic statute, the means used by a defendant to meet an 
element are irrelevant.20 If the above hypothetical murder statute added 
 
17 See United States v. Archer, No. 2:14-CR-00334, 2015 WL 3562549, at *2 (D. Utah 
June 4, 2015) (noting that the application of the modified approach in cases is rare). 
18 See, e.g., D.C. Code § 22-2101; Cal. Pen. Code §§ 187–88 (defining murder as killing 
with malice aforethought and defining malice as a “deliberate intention [] to take away the life 
of a fellow creature”); Miss. Code § 97-3-19(1)(a); 720 ILCS 5/9-1; 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a); 
Michigan v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 714 (1980). 
19 This is essentially the classic common law doctrine of transferred intent, where “a 
defendant who . . . [intends] to kill a certain person and [kills] a bystander instead is subject to 
the same criminal liability that would have been imposed had the fatal blow reached the person 
for whom intended.” California v. Bland, 28 Cal. 4th 313, 321 (Cal. 2002); see also Lieutenant 
Colonel LeEllen Coacher & Captain Libby Gallo, Criminal Liability: Transferred Intent and 
Concurrent Intent, 44 A.F. L. REV. 227, 229 (1998) (“The doctrine of transferred intent exists 
when a defendant, who intends to kill one person but instead kills a bystander, is deemed the 
author for whatever kind of homicide would have been committed had he killed the intended 
victim.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Daniel J. Curry, Poe v. State: The Court of 
Appeals of Maryland Limits the Applicability of the Doctrine of Transferred Intent, 27 U. 
BALT. L. REV. 167, 167 (1997) (“The doctrine has been viable since the early English common 
law.”); William L. Prosser, Transferred Intent, 45 TEX. L. REV. 650, 652 (1967) (“The doctrine 
of “transferred intent” appeared first in criminal cases at a time when tort and crime were still 
merged in the trespass action.”). 
20 See Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2290 (2013) (“As long as the statute 
itself requires only an indeterminate ‘weapon,’ that is all the indictment must (or is likely to) 
allege and all the jury instructions must (or are likely to) mention. And most important, that is 
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another element to define murder as “unlawful killing with intent to kill by 
use of a weapon,” it would not matter if the defendant used a knife, a gun, or 
a bike chain; as long as a weapon is used, the element would be met.21 In the 
end, a prosecutor must prove a single group of elements for a jury to convict 
a defendant of the crime.22 
The distinctive (but not dispositive) characteristic of divisible statutes is 
that they have an element written in the alternative. The crime itself has the 
same name attached to it, but the defendant need not satisfy every element 
listed to have committed the crime. The murder statute described above 
would become divisible if revised to say murder is “unlawful killing with 
intent to kill by use of a weapon in a car or in a home.” Now the statutory 
elements are as follows: (1) someone was killed; (2) the killing was not 
permitted by law; (3) the killing was accomplished with a weapon; (4) the 
actor intended to kill; and (5) the killing was either in a (a) car or (b) home. 
This is what the Court meant when it referred to a divisible statute as “a 
[single] statutory provision that covers several different generic crimes.”23 
The defendant can be guilty of murder whether he snuck into the victim’s 
house and shot him or strangled him from the backseat of the victim’s car 
with a piano wire.24 A prosecutor need not prove that the defendant killed in 
both the car and the home to satisfy the last element. The alternative means 
at issue here would be the gun or the piano wire to commit the murder since 
either can be used as a weapon. The alternative element is the location of the 
murder.25 
The distinction between indivisible and divisible statutes has a major 
effect on the way a court determines whether a state criminal statute is the 
same as a generic offense, and thus, whether the defendant’s prior conviction 
carries ACCA or immigration consequences. Interpreting state criminal 
statutes to see if they are consistent with federal criminal statutes that would 
 
all the jury must find to convict the defendant. The jurors need not all agree on whether the 
defendant used a gun or a knife or a tire iron (or any other particular weapon that might appear 
in an imagined divisible statute), because the actual statute requires the jury to find only a 
‘weapon.’”). 
21 Id.; see 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons and Firearms § 1 (“A ‘weapon’ is broadly defined as 
anything used or designed to be used in destroying, defeating, or injuring an enemy; it is an 
instrument of offensive or defensive combat.”). 
22 Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2290. 
23 Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 41 (2009). 
24 THE GODFATHER (Paramount Pictures 1972). 
25 A statute written in the disjunctive, however, does not always mean the statute is 
divisible. As discussed further below, whether a statute is divisible or indivisible depends on 
whether the statute lists alternative means of conduct to satisfy the element or actual alternative 
elements. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285. 
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be predicates for sentence enhancement or removal is not as easy as looking 
at the labels affixed to each statute.26 Thus, the Supreme Court, out of 
necessity, developed two different approaches to help resolve this issue. 
B. CATEGORICAL APPROACH 
In Taylor v. United States, the Supreme Court established the “formal 
categorical approach,” through which courts interpret convictions under state 
criminal statutes as potential predicates for federal sentence enhancement.”27 
The Court held that sentencing courts may only look at elements of the prior 
offense and not the facts of the underlying conviction.28 If a state criminal 
statute is the same as (or narrower than) the generic crime, then it is a “violent 
felony” as defined by the ACCA.29 Even if the conviction statute prohibits 
conduct that is narrower than a generic crime, it can be a violent felony.30 
However, if the state criminal statute criminalizes conduct that is broader 
than the generic crime, it cannot count as a violent felony as defined by the 
ACCA, even if the facts would show that the crime was committed according 
to the generic requirements.31 Therefore, when sentencing, courts are only 
allowed to look to the elements of the statute and not the facts of the 
underlying case.32 
C. MODIFIED CATEGORICAL APPROACH33 
Taylor recognized that there were going to be cases where looking at 
“the charging paper and jury instructions” would be necessary.34 Although 
the Court stressed that this “range of cases” would be particularly “narrow,” 
this unnamed approach would make it permissible to look at some of the 
underlying documents when the statute has alternative elements, or, in other 
words, is divisible.35 One element would be part of the generic offense and 
 
26 The state criminal statute at issue in the Ninth Circuit case Rendon v. Holder is a prime 
example, as the California “burglary” statute criminalizes conduct that is greater than the 
generic offense of burglary. 764 F.3d 1077, 1090 (2014). 
27 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990). 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 599. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990). 
33 Although courts are still dissatisfied with the uninspired label for this approach, they 
have yet to come up with a better name. See Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 
(2013) (“We have previously approved a variant of this method—labeled (not very 
inventively) the ‘modified categorical approach.’”). 
34 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. 
35 Id.  
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the alternative element would not.36 
The Taylor Court imagined a burglary statute that prohibits breaking 
into a car or a building.37 The building is part of the generic offense of 
burglary because it is an element in a majority of state criminal codes. Cars, 
however, are not included in a majority of burglary codes. To convict a 
defendant for burglary, a prosecutor would need to charge and prove one 
element to the jury, while ignoring the other.38 It is impossible to charge a 
defendant with simultaneously breaking into a building and a car since a 
person cannot physically be in two different places at the same time.39 
According to the Taylor Court, one scenario—the building—involves 
all the elements of the generic crime of burglary.40 The other scenario—the 
car—would not be an element of the generic crime of burglary because it 
criminalizes behavior broader than the generic crime of burglary.41 While the 
building scenario is applicable to the ACCA for sentencing purposes, it is not 
clear, from just looking at the statute, that the defendant was convicted of the 
generic crime.42 In Taylor’s example, it would be necessary for the 
sentencing court to look at a limited set of underlying documents, specifically 
the indictment or jury instructions, to see if the defendant was convicted of 
breaking into a house or into a car.43 
Shepard v. United States was the first Supreme Court case to use this 
modified categorical approach.44 Significantly, the Supreme Court first held 
that guilty pleas are just as applicable as jury verdicts for purposes of 




38 Id. (“[I]f the indictment or information and jury instructions show that the defendant 
was charged only with a burglary of a building, and that the jury necessarily had to find an 
entry of a building to convict, then the Government should be allowed to use the conviction 
for enhancement.”). 
39 Assuming the car is not inside the building. 
40 See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. 
41 Id.; see Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 17 (2005) (“Because statutes in some 
States (like Massachusetts) define burglary more broadly, as by extending it to entries into 
boats and cars, we had to consider how a later court sentencing under the ACCA might tell 
whether a prior burglary conviction was for the generic offense.”); see also Jennifer Lee Koh, 
The Whole is Better than the Sum: A Case for the Categorical Approach to Determining the 
Immigration Consequences of Crime, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 311 (2012).  
42 See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. 
43 Id. 
44 544 U.S. 13, 23 (2005). 
45 Id. at 20 (“In cases tried without a jury, the closest analogs to jury instructions would be 
a bench-trial judge’s formal rulings of law and findings of fact, and in pleaded cases they 
would be the statement of factual basis for the charge . . . shown by a transcript of plea 
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that, in this context at least, there is no difference between a defendant 
admitting to all necessary elements of a charged offense and a jury finding 
beyond a reasonable doubt that all the necessary elements have been met.46 
The Shepard Court next held that, when faced with a divisible statute, 
for a conviction to actually be a predicate for the ACCA, the defendant must 
still admit to the elements of a generic offense.47 In this case, the burglary 
statute had an alternative element that provided for breaking into a building, 
car, or boat.48 The guilty plea did not indicate whether the defendant broke 
into a building (satisfying the ACCA) or a boat or a car (which would not 
satisfy the ACCA).49 The Court held that because of this ambiguity—and the 
fact the defendant confessed—the district court could look at the plea 
agreement or the plea colloquy, to see if the defendant pled guilty to the 
generic element or the alternative element, bringing the total amount of 
reviewable documents to four.50 The Court reiterated that the modified 
approach does not permit looking at facts of the underlying conviction, but 
at the elements the defendant was convicted of to see if they comported with 
the general offense.51 
The modified categorical approach, set forth in Taylor and Shepard, was 
given its name in Nijhawan v. Holder.52 In Nijhawan, the Supreme Court 
analyzed a Massachusetts statute that prohibited breaking and entering at 
night in any of four alternative places: a “building, ship, vessel, or vehicle.”53 
Only one of those places—the building—would qualify as a predicate for the 
ACCA.54 The Court noted that when a single statute involves different crimes 
and not all of them fit into an ACCA definition, courts must determine which 
crime formed the basis of the conviction.55 To do that, courts must look at 
 
colloquy or by written plea agreement presented to the court, or by a record of comparable 
findings of fact adopted by the defendant upon entering the plea.”). 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 17. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 20. 
51 Id. at 26 (“We hold that enquiry under the ACCA to determine whether a plea of guilty 
to burglary defined by a nongeneric statute necessarily admitted elements of the generic 
offense is limited to the terms of the charging document, the terms of a plea agreement or 
transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in which the factual basis for the plea was 
confirmed by the defendant, or to some comparable judicial record of this information.”). 
52 557 U.S. 29, 49 (2009). 
53 Id. at 35 (quoting Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 266, § 16 (West 2006)). 
54 Id. 
55 Id. (“[A] court must determine whether an offender’s prior conviction was for the 
violent, rather than the nonviolent, breaking that this single five-word phrase describes (e.g., 
breaking into a building rather than into a vessel).”). 
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one of the limited set of documents permitted in cases like Taylor and 
Shepard.56 The Supreme Court reiterated this in Johnson v. United States, 
holding that a court may not look to these documents to determine the 
underlying facts of the conviction, but only the “statutory phrase” that is the 
basis of conviction.57 
II. WHEN A STATUTE IS DIVISIBLE AND WHEN IT IS NOT 
Despite the directives and guidelines of Taylor, Shepard, Nijhawan, and 
Johnson, lower courts were still confused as to when and how to apply the 
modified approach.58 This came to a head in Descamps v. United States,59 
where the Court considered whether “courts may also consult [the documents 
approved in Taylor and Shepard] when a defendant was convicted under an 
‘indivisible’ statute . . . that criminalizes a broader swath of conduct than the 
relevant generic offense.”60 The Court held, emphatically, that it is not 
permissible for interpreting indivisible statutes, as the approach would allow 
courts to abuse their position by consistently looking past the fact of 
conviction to the underlying facts of the prior conviction, even if the elements 
are not a predicate under the categorical approach.61 
Descamps also held that, for a statute to be divisible, the alternative 
elements must provide for different crimes within the same set of elements, 
while alternative means are only different ways of meeting one element in 
that set.62 While the Court made this distinction, it left relatively little 
guidance as to identifying what are alternative elements and what are 
alternative means when reading a statute.63 
 
56 Id. 
57  559 U.S. 133, 144 (2010) (“[T]he ‘modified categorical approach’ . . . permits a court 
to determine which statutory phrase was the basis for the conviction by consulting the trial 
record . . . .”). 
58 See, e.g., United States v. Venzor-Granillo, 668 F.3d 1224, 1231 (10th Cir. 2012) 
(holding an ambiguity existed where the language in a state criminal statute criminalized 
broader conduct and that permitted the use of the modified approach). 
59 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013). 
60 Id. at 2281. 
61 Id. at 2281-82. 
62 Id. at 2285 n.2; see also United States v. Cabrera-Gutierrez, 756 F.3d 1125, 1137 (9th 
Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 124, 190 (2014) (“[U]nder Descamps, what must be 
divisible are the elements of the crime, not the mode or means of proving an element.”). 
63 E.g., compare Rendon v. Holder, 764 F.3d 1077, 1084–90 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(means/elements determined by whether jury must unanimously agree on phrasing, then 
documents can be consulted), with Rendon v. Holder, 782 F.3d 466, 466–473 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(denial of en banc review) (Graber, J., dissenting (joined by seven judges)) (courts must look 
at underlying documents to see if it is a predicate offense first) and id. at 473–474 (Kozinski, 
J., dissenting) (courts can take a “peek” at the documents to resolve means/elements dispute). 
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Three years later, in Mathis v. United States,64 the Court again addressed 
this issue and attempted to answer the question of “whether ACCA makes an 
exception to [the] rule [of equal or narrower elements of the generic crime] 
when a defendant is convicted under a statute that lists multiple, alternative 
means of satisfying one (or more) of its elements.”65 The Court held that it 
does not,66 but also tried to answer the question of when a statute lists means 
or elements.67 To the Court, the answer largely depended on each 
jurisdiction’s own interpretation or phrasing, but, if that was still not clear, it 
was permissible for federal sentencing courts to look to the Taylor/Shepard 
documents in order to answer the question.68 
A. CORRECTING LOWER COURT APPLICATIONS OF THE MODIFIED 
APPROACH: DESCAMPS 
Justice Kagan’s majority opinion in Descamps is one of the best 
illustrations of the differences between the formal categorical approach and 
the modified categorical approach.69 Matthew Robert Descamps was 
convicted of illegal possession of a firearm and had an extensive criminal 
history, which included three previous felony convictions.70 One of these 
previous convictions was under California Penal Code § 459, which, as the 
Court described it, applies to: “A ‘person who enters’ certain locations ‘with 
intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary.’”71 
Descamps’s sentence under the possession statute would have only been ten 
years, but, if applicable, the ACCA would have increased his sentence to a 
minimum of fifteen years.72 
The district court used the modified categorical approach and examined 
documents from the prior conviction—specifically the plea colloquy—to 
find that Descamps’s burglary involved breaking and entering.73 The court 
concluded that Descamps’s § 459 conviction qualified as generic burglary 
and was within the definition of a violent felony under the ACCA.74 
 
64 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016). 
65 Id. at 2248–49. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 2256–57. 
68 Id. 
69 Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2283–86 (2013). 
70 United States v. Descamps, No. CR–05–104–FVS, 2012 WL 3144051, at *1 (E.D. 
Wash. Nov. 21, 2007). 
71 Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2282 (quoting Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 459 (West 2010)). 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at Appendix F, at 50a. 
74 Id. 
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed.75 Relying on its previous decision in United 
States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca,76 the court held that if a state criminal statute 
is categorically broader than the generic crime, a court is permitted to use the 
modified categorical approach to scrutinize certain conviction documents.77 
Descamps appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the California statute 
was broader than usual burglary statutes and therefore the conviction did not 
meet the standards for a violent felony.78 
The Supreme Court reversed.79 It clarified that the modified categorical 
approach is only used in limited circumstances where it is unclear which 
element in a divisible statute was met to bring about the conviction.80 Citing 
Taylor, the Court ruled that the California statute did not meet the ACCA 
violent felony standard because it was too broad.81 Further, it ruled that § 459 
does not have divisible elements and covers simple shoplifting as well as 
burglary.82 Since not all the elements of the generic crime of burglary needed 
to be proven at trial, the California statute was not a predicate ACCA 
offense.83 
The Court based part of its reasoning on the text and history of the 
ACCA.84 Because the statutory language specifically identifies convictions, 
and not merely commissions, Congress intended for courts to only look at the 
fact of conviction and not underlying facts giving rise to the convictions.85 
Other statutes may point to circumstances rather than convictions, but the 
ACCA’s legislative history showed that Congress intended only the 
conviction to count for enhancement, and not for the enhancement to depend 
 
75 United States v. Descamps, 466 F. App’x 563, 565–66 (9th Cir. 2012). 
76 655 F.3d 915, 944 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (per curiam), abrogated by Descamps, 133 
S. Ct. at 2286–92. 
77 Descamps, 466 F. App’x at 565 (“Burglary under § 459 is categorically broader than 
generic burglary . . . . We therefore apply the modified categorical approach.”). 
78 Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2282. 
79 Id. at 2293. 
80 Id. at 2285. (“The modified approach thus has no role to play in this case. The dispute 
here does not concern any list of alternative elements. Rather, it involves a simple discrepancy 
between generic burglary and the crime established in § 459.”). 
81 Id. at 2285–86. 
82 Id. (“[Generic burglary] requires an unlawful entry along the lines of breaking and 
entering . . . . [§ 459] does not, and indeed covers simple shoplifting, as even the Government 
acknowledges . . . .  [Therefore], § 459 define[s] burglary more broadly than the generic 
offense . . . . [B]ecause California, to get a conviction, need not prove that Descamps broke 
and entered—a § 459 violation cannot serve as an ACCA predicate.” (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted)). 
83 Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285–86. 
84 Id. at 2287. 
85 Id. 
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on the facts of the case.86 
The Court also reasoned that applying the modified categorical 
approach to indivisible statutes would allow a reviewing court to evaluate 
evidence, which is not appropriate in most circumstances.87 This would give 
the reviewing court the power to determine what facts the jury relied upon to 
convict, or the judge accepted in a plea,88 violating the Sixth Amendment.89 
Moreover, according to the Court, facts in these underlying documents 
are often misleading and uncertain.90 A defendant may have no incentive to 
challenge, and may be less likely to challenge, certain facts if they are not 
part of a charged element.91 Trials often contain extraneous facts that have 
little or no bearing on the elements of the crime.92 Defendants are also less 
likely to quibble with a court or prosecutors over factual allegations during a 
plea agreement.93 
Lastly, the Court ruled that the Ninth Circuit’s holding had (or could 
have) disastrous effects for defendants in plea agreements.94 When agreeing 
to plea deals, defendants often plead guilty to lesser included offenses in 
exchange for lighter sentences.95 The crime charged may qualify for 
enhancement under the ACCA, but the crime pled to may not qualify.96 If 
later federal sentencing courts were allowed to use the modified approach on 
a much looser basis, defendants could be found to have pled to the qualifying 
crime for ACCA enhancement based on “extraneous statements in the 
 
86 Id. (“Congress instead meant [for the] ACCA to function as an on-off switch, directing 
that a prior crime would qualify as a predicate offense in all cases or in none.”). 
87 Id. at 2289 (“[T]he Ninth Circuit’s ruling flouts our reasoning—here, by extending 
judicial factfinding beyond the recognition of a prior conviction.”). 
88 See id. (“But the Ninth Circuit’s reworking authorizes the court to try to discern what a 
trial showed, or a plea proceeding revealed, about the defendant’s underlying conduct . . . . 
And there’s the constitutional rub.” (internal citation omitted)). 
89 Id. (“The Sixth Amendment contemplates that a jury—not a sentencing court—will find 
such facts, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt. And the only facts the court can be 
sure the jury so found are those constituting elements of the offense—as distinct from 
amplifying but legally extraneous circumstances.”). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id.  
93 See id. (“[Descamps] likely was not thinking about the possibility that his silence could 
come back to haunt him in an ACCA sentencing 30 years in the future. (Actually, he could not 
have been thinking that thought: [the] ACCA was not even on the books at the time of 
Descamps’ burglary conviction.”)). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id.  
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record.”97 
Descamps was a pushback against lower courts’ expansion of the 
modified categorical approach. While Taylor, Shepard, and other cases made 
it clear that the modified approach was only appropriate for a narrow category 
of cases, lower courts misinterpreted those cases and applied the modified 
approach to improperly enhance sentences under the ACCA.98 Those courts 
should only have used the formal categorical approach, which would have 
cut off all further inquiry. While both lower courts and the executive followed 
what they believed to be the proper interpretation of longstanding precedent, 
Descamps gave clear direction going forward to protect defendants from 
methods the Court viewed as going too far. 
The Court, however, did not explicitly lay out a test for determining 
when a statute actually is divisible; that is, when it lists alternative elements, 
not alternative means. The Court did somewhat address this issue in footnote 
2 of the opinion.99 Responding to the dissent’s point that “distinguishing 
between ‘alternative elements’ and ‘alternative means’ is difficult,” the Court 
stated “[w]hen a state law is drafted in the alternative, the court merely resorts 
to the approved [Taylor/Shepard] documents and compares the elements 
revealed there to those of the generic offense.”100 
This reasoning presented a few problems. First, it seems to be wholly at 
odds with the policies articulated in the body of Justice Kagan’s opinion, 
which clearly prohibit a court from considering these documents without first 
deciding whether the statute is divisible as a threshold issue. If the categorical 
approach was designed to foster an elements inquiry and to prevent judicial 
fact-finding based upon faulty documents, it does not follow that courts 
should be able to engage in fact-finding to determine the threshold issue of 
whether the statute is divisible. While some have characterized footnote 2 as 
a “clear instruction,”101 it appeared to not be reconciled with the main text of 
the opinion. At the very least, this caused more confusion among the lower 
 
97 Id. (“Taylor recognized the problem: If a guilty plea to a lesser, nonburglary offense 
was the result of a plea bargain . . . it would seem unfair to impose a sentence enhancement as 
if the defendant had pleaded guilty to generic burglary. That way of proceeding, on top of 
everything else, would allow a later sentencing court to rewrite the parties’ bargain.” (quoting 
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 601–602 (1990)) (internal quotation marks, citations, 
and alterations omitted)). 
98 See United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915, 944 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) 
(per curiam) (abrogated by Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2286–92). 
99 Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285 n.2. 
100 Id.  
101 Rendon v. Holder, 782 F.3d 466, 469–71 (9th Cir. 2015) (Graber, J., dissenting from 
the denial of en banc review). 
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courts.102 
The question, thus, was still left largely unanswered: how is a court to 
determine when a statute lists divisible elements (two distinct sets of elements 
within the whole103) instead of simply different means by which to complete 
the same element? In other words, what test should courts use to determine 
when a statute is divisible? 
B. WHEN A STATUTE LISTS MEANS OR ELEMENTS: MATHIS 
The question of divisible statutes wound its way to the Court again three 
years after Decamps in Mathis v. United States.104 On January 21, 2014, 
Richard Mathis pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in 
violation of the ACCA.105 Mathis’s previous felonies were for five prior 
burglary convictions in Iowa.106 At sentencing, the prosecution requested a 
sentence enhancement like in Descamps, arguing his prior convictions were 
predicates under the ACCA.107 
The Iowa burglary statutes in question prohibited unlawfully entering 
any “occupied structure,”108 defined as “any building, structure, . . . vehicle, 
or similar place.”109 The district court found the Iowa statute to be divisible 
and applied the modified categorical approach to determine which elements 
Mathis was convicted of in order to further determine whether they were 
predicates for sentence enhancement.110 The district court found these prior 
convictions were violent felonies and sentenced him to the mandatory 
minimum of fifteen years under the ACCA.111 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed.112 Even though the Eighth Circuit noted 
 
102 E.g., compare Rendon v. Holder, 764 F.3d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that the 
means/elements distinction prevented looking at the Taylor/Shepard documents to resolve the 
divisibility issue), with United States v. Mathis, 786 F.3d 1068, 1069 (8th Cir. 2015), rev’d, 
Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (holding that Descamps expressly rejected a 
means/elements distinction and always allowed looking at the approved documents if the 
statute criminalized more conduct than the generic offense). 
103 See Rendon, 764 F.3d at 1086. 
104 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016). 
105 Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2250; see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). 
106 Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2250. 
107 Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). 
108 Iowa Code §§ 713.1 (defining burglary as unlawfully entering, remaining in, or 
breaking an occupied structure with “intent to commit a felony, assault, or theft therein”), 
713.5 (defining second-degree burglary, in part, as burglary in an occupied structure). 
109 Iowa Code §§ 702.12 (defining “occupied structure”). 
110 Mathis, 786 F.3d at 1070–71, rev’d, Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2243. 
111 Id. at 1071. 
112 Id. at 1076. 
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the Iowa statute “sweeps more broadly than generic burglary” due to the 
expanded definition of “occupied structure,” it concluded this was “the exact 
type of divisibility contemplated in Taylor and later solved in Shepard.”113 
Thus, the modified categorical approach was the “proper tool to determine 
whether Mathis’s prior convictions are ‘violent felonies.’”114 
The Eighth Circuit rejected Mathis’s argument that these were not 
alternative elements, but rather alternative means by which to satisfy the 
same element.115 The circuit court reasoned that footnote 2 of Descamps 
actually eliminated a means/elements distinction and held that any 
disjunctive list within a criminal statute made the statute divisible.116 Thus, 
whenever this type of list exists in a statute that sweeps broader than the 
generic offense, the court is allowed to look at the documents approved by 
the modified categorical approach to determine if the defendant was 
convicted of a “violent felony” under the ACCA.117 
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit in another majority 
opinion written by Justice Kagan.118 The Court reaffirmed that “a state crime 
cannot qualify as an ACCA predicate if its elements are broader than those 
of a listed generic offense” and “[h]ow a given defendant actually perpetrated 
the crime . . . makes no difference; . . . the mismatch of elements saves [him] 
from an ACCA sentence.”119 The Court also clarified that there indeed was a 
means/elements distinction, holding the existence of a disjunctive list “gives 
a sentencing court no special warrant to explore the facts of an offense, rather 
than to determine the crime’s elements and compare them with the generic 
definition.”120 
The Court did address what it called “the first task of a sentencing 
court”: figuring out whether a statute lists elements or means.121 The Court, 
reasoning that a state is the final authority on the interpretation of its own 
laws, held that “authoritative sources of state law” on the matter are the first 
thing a sentencing court should look for.122 Thus, if the state’s courts have 
already interpreted the statute to contain alternative elements or means, “a 
 
113 Id. at 1074. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 1074–75.  
117 Id. at 1075. The Eighth Circuit’s decision created a circuit split on this issue. Mathis v. 
United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2251 (2016). 
118 Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2247, 2250. 
119 Id. at 2251. 
120 Id.  
121 Id. at 2256. 
122 Id. 
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sentencing judge need only follow what [such a ruling] says.”123 Another 
authoritative source is the face of the state criminal statute itself.124 If the 
listed alternatives require different penalties, then they must be different 
elements.125 On the other hand, if the statute merely gives “illustrative 
examples,” they are means to commit the crime.126 Finally, the statute itself 
may also indicate what is essential to be charged (elements) and what is not 
(means).127 
In Mathis’s case, the Iowa Supreme Court has previously interpreted the 
burglary statute at issue to list “alternative methods of committing the same 
offense, so that a jury need not agree whether the burgled location was a 
building, other structure, or vehicle.”128 Thus, the statutes that Mathis was 
previously convicted under were not divisible and the modified categorical 
approach was not applicable to the case.129 Therefore, since the conduct 
criminalized by the Iowa burglary statutes was greater than the generic 
offense, none of Mathis’s prior convictions could be used as predicates under 
the ACCA and his sentence could not be enhanced.130 
The Court, albeit in dicta, also clarified the ambiguities Descamps.131 If 
the sources of state law fail to clarify whether the listed alternatives are 
elements or means, the sentencing court should look to the approved 
Taylor/Shepard documents “for the sole and limited purpose of determining 
whether the listed items are elements of the offense.”132 The record would 
reveal what the prosecutor would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
and what jurors could disagree on yet still find all the elements were 
 
123 Id. (citing Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 636 (1991) (plurality) (“If a State’s courts 
have determined that certain statutory alternatives are mere means of committing a single 
offense, rather than independent elements of the crime, we simply are not at liberty to ignore 
that determination and conclude that the alternatives are, in fact, independent elements under 
state law.”)). 
124 Id. 
125 Id. (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 468 (2000)); see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. 
§ 28.35.060 (requiring motorists in accidents to both provide their personal information and 
render reasonable assistance to any person injured (subsection (a)), but making it a 
misdemeanor to fail to provide information (subsection (b)) and a felony to fail to render 
reasonable assistance (subsection (c))). 
126 Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. (citing State v. Duncan, 312 N.W.2d 519, 523 (Iowa 1981)). 
129 Id. at 2253–54. 
130 Id. at 2257. 
131 Id. at 2251. 
132 Id. at 2256–57 (quoting Rendon v. Holder, 782 F.3d 466, 473–74 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting from the denial of reh’g en banc) (internal quotation marks and 
alterations omitted)). 
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proved.133 In the unlikely event the documents do not resolve the inquiry, 
“Taylor’s demand for certainty” will never be satisfied and the offense should 
not be considered an ACCA predicate.134 However, this last situation is likely 
to be extraordinarily rare.135 
The sentencing court is still prohibited from using those record 
documents if it turns out the statute only lists means and not elements.136 The 
Court explained it had no problem with a sentencing judge knowing the 
underlying facts of a previous conviction, so long as that judge did not use 
those facts to determine the previous conviction was a predicate offense if 
the elements did not match up.137 
Justice Kennedy joined the majority opinion because it faithfully 
applied the Court’s precedents, but wrote separately to express his 
reservations with the elements based approach.138 To Justice Kennedy, the 
elements based approach is compelled by the Court’s interpretation of 
Congress’s statutes and, if Congress has a problem with this approach, it can 
overturn those precedents.139 That being said, the majority opinion, to him, 
“is a stark illustration of the arbitrary and inequitable results produced by 
applying an elements based approach to this sentencing scheme.”140 To 
Justice Kennedy, Congress could never have intended for career offenders to 
be shielded from punishment or face “vast sentencing disparities” compared 
to defendants in other jurisdictions for the same exact conduct.141 He 
reasoned, however, that it was not for the Court to overturn their own 
precedent (absent an appropriate case), but for Congress to fix on their own 
by amending the ACCA.142 
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented, arguing that the 
elements/means distinction is an unnecessary complication to sentencing and 
causes more confusion among lower courts than it provides clarity.143 To 
 
133 Id.  
134 Id. (quoting Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 21 (2005)). 
135 Id.  
136 Id. at 2257. 
137 Id. at 2251 (“In some cases, a sentencing judge knows (or can easily discover) that the 
defendant carried out a ‘real’ burglary, even though the crime of conviction also extends to 
other conduct. No matter. Under ACCA . . . it is impermissible for a particular crime [to] 
sometimes count towards enhancement and sometimes not, depending on the facts of the 
case.”). 
138 Id. at 2258. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Id.  
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 2259. 
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Justice Breyer, the distinction between the two makes sense in the abstract, 
but the distinction does not make a difference in practical application at 
sentencing.144 While this distinction is relevant to the state’s own application 
of its criminal law, to Justice Breyer, it makes no sense to use it in federal 
sentencing.145 The approach that uses this distinction is impractical or 
unworkable in real situations, and “will produce a time-consuming legal 
tangle” for lower courts to slog through.146 
Justice Breyer argued what should really matter are the facts designated 
in the statute, not whether those facts are used by the state as elements or 
means.147 He would do away with the elements/means distinction and instead 
allow prior convictions to serve as predicates if “(1) the statute at issue lists 
the alternative means by which a defendant can commit the crime . . . and (2) 
the charging documents make clear that the . . . jury or trial judge necessarily 
found . . . an alternative that matches the federal version of the crime.”148 
Justice Alito also dissented and heavily criticized the Court’s 
precedent.149 To Justice Alito, the Court’s categorical/modified categorical 
approaches, indivisible/divisible inquiries, and now elements/means 
distinctions had created an unworkable and impractical way of determining 
whether previous convictions were indeed “violent felonies.”150 Justice Alito 
instead advocated for “[a] real-world approach [to] avoid the mess” produced 
by previous decisions which would allow the sentencing court to look at the 
record regardless of elements.151 If it is clear the underlying facts support the 
previous conviction as a predicate for ACCA purposes, then it counts.152 It 
would not count, however, “[i]f the record is lost or inconclusive.”153 To 
Justice Alito, the majority’s approach rendered real-world facts irrelevant and 
instead advanced “pointless formalism.”154 
 
144 Id. at 2261. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 2264. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 2265 (emphasis in original). The majority responded to Justice Breyer by 
restating that the Court’s precedents (such as Taylor, Shepard and even Descamps) dictated 
the use of the elements/means distinction. Id. at 2254–56. 
149 Id. at 2265–70. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 2269–70. 
152 Id. at 2270. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 2271. The majority responded to Justice Alito in much the same way it did to 
Justice Breyer. See id. at 2254 n.4. 
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III. DISCUSSION 
The Supreme Court noted in Taylor and its progeny that, by specifically 
identifying certain crimes as predicates in statutes such as the ACCA, 
Congress created categories of offenses that excluded other offenses which 
did not fit the generic definition.155 Congress intended both to prevent 
arbitrary limitations by state definition and to provide fundamental fairness 
to offenders.156 According to the Court, sentence enhancement cannot turn 
“on whether the State of [an offender’s] prior conviction happened to call 
[the] conduct” a particular offense.157 
Thus, it is a matter of statutory interpretation when a court is faced with 
the question of whether a prior conviction is a predicate for sentence 
enhancement (or removal) or not. In other words, Congress has created these 
categories of generic crimes in a way that draws a line between predicate, 
generic offenses and non-predicate offenses.158 The courts are not to exercise 
their own judgment as to whether the specific facts of the underlying 
conviction fit into these categories, but only to whether the elements of the 
state criminal statute at issue fit into a generic category.159 Moreover, the 
Court, in adopting the categorical approach, highlights a preference to 
prevent judicial fact-finding into underlying convictions and to preserve jury 
fact-finding from being subverted.160 
There are still giant ambiguities, however, when it comes to putting the 
approaches into practice. Justice Alito was correct that this area of 
interpretation is fraught with peril and misunderstanding among the lower 
courts. Historically, determining when the modified approach was 
 
155 Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 591 (1990). While the amendments at issue in 
Taylor eliminated a specific definition of burglary, the Court noted that “[w]ithout a clear 
indication that . . . [it] intended to abandon its general approach of using uniform categorical 
definitions to identify predicate offenses, we do not interpret Congress’ omission of a 
definition of ‘burglary’ in a way that leads to odd results of [different application from state 
to state].” Id. 
156 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 582; see also S. Rep. No. 98–190, p. 20 (1983) (“Because of the 
wide variation among states and localities in the ways that offenses are labeled, the absence of 
definitions raised the possibility that culpable offenders might escape punishment [at the 
federal level] on a technicality. . . . [F]or purposes of this Act, such limitations are not 
appropriate. Furthermore, in terms of fundamental fairness [to the defendant], the Act should 
ensure, to the extent that it is consistent with the prerogatives of the States in defining their 
own offenses, that the same type of conduct is punishable on the Federal level in all cases.”). 
157 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 591. 
158 Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2283 (2013). 
159 Id. 
160 See Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2282 (2013); Johnson v. United States, 
559 U.S. 133, 144 (2010); Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 49 (2009); Shepard v. United 
States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990). 
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appropriate was immensely confusing for lower courts and led to inconsistent 
results, especially pre-Descamps. For instance, in United States v. Aguila-
Montes De Oca, the Ninth Circuit held that the modified approach applied to 
an indivisible statute simply because it was broader than the generic crime.161 
In United States v. Venzor-Granillo, the Tenth Circuit held that the modified 
approach applied merely because the language in the statute was ambiguous 
through criminalizing broader conduct.162 In contrast, the Seventh Circuit in 
United States v. Fife held that the statutory phrase “any felony” required a 
sentencing court to look beyond the fact of conviction to see what felony met 
the element.163 And in United States v. Martinez-Hernandez, another Tenth 
Circuit case, the court stated “when the underlying statute reaches a broad 
range of conduct, some of which merits an enhancement and some of which 
does not, courts resolve the resulting ambiguity by consulting reliable judicial 
records, such as the charging document, plea agreement, or plea colloquy.”164 
These holdings clearly confused the statutory interpretation function of the 
categorical and modified categorical approaches. 
Even post-Descamps, this approach has still created confusion, often in 
the same jurisdiction.165 In addition to being not particularly easy to 
determine, deciding the means or elements has been a source of frustration 
for the lower courts as well.166 
Justices Kennedy, Breyer and Alito were also all correct in concluding 
that the approaches have caused arbitrary results for defendants and lawful 
permanent residents, as they could have their sentences enhanced or be sent 
to a different country depending on what judicial circuit they inhabit, rather 
than creating a consistent application of federal statutes across all federal 
jurisdictions. According to the Taylor Court, this is exactly what Congress 
did not want to happen (albeit with an eye to differing state criminal 
statutes).167 As Kennedy noted, while this approach is dictated by the statute 
and is intended to create uniform application of federal sentencing law, in 
practice it becomes what it was intended to avoid: a patchwork of different 
 
161 655 F.3d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (per curiam), abrogated by Descamps v. 
United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2286–92 (2013). 
162 668 F.3d 1224, 1231 (10th Cir. 2012). 
163 624 F.3d 441, 446 (7th Cir. 2010). 
164 422 F.3d 1084, 1086 (10th Cir. 2005). 
165 See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2268. For an illustration, compare Rendon v. Holder, 764 
F.3d 1077, 1084–90 (9th Cir. 2014), where the panel opinion held that looking at the 
Taylor/Shepard documents was inappropriate without first finding the statute is divisible, with 
its denial of en banc review, 782 F.3d 466, 466–474, where nine judges disagreed. 
166 See Rendon, 782 F.3d at 471 (describing the inquiry after Descamps as “notoriously 
uncertain” and leading to “uncertain results”). 
167 See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 590–91. 
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results dependent upon where the conduct took place, regardless if it was 
targeted by the statute.168 
Another complication in the means/elements determination is the 
tension between the rationale for the modified approach stated in Descamps 
and the method for determining whether a statute it divisible in Mathis. The 
Descamps Court clarified that the modified approach is only a tool that allows 
a court to determine what crime someone was convicted of when faced with 
several alternatives so that crime can be compared to the generic offense.169 
The Court has never held that it is an exception that allows those courts to 
look at the underlying facts from that previous conviction to decide for itself 
what facts supported the defendant’s conviction.170 The modified approach is 
only allowed when the defendant is convicted under a divisible statute that 
contains more than one offense within the same set of elements.171 Even when 
the modified approach is used, a court is still only allowed to discover what 
elements the defendant was convicted of and not the underlying facts of the 
conviction.172 The tight restrictions on its use illustrate the Court’s preference 
for using it sparingly and only when necessary. 
Mathis was a further tightening of the controls for when this approach 
can and cannot be used, but, curiously, the Court approved of a lower court 
crossing the threshold to make the determination of whether it can cross the 
threshold.173 The Court appeared confident that a sentencing court—and, by 
extension, an immigration judge—would not use its knowledge of the true 
underlying facts when making the threshold determination of divisible or 
 
168 Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2258. 
169 Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2285 (2013). 
170 Id.; see also Michael R. Devitt, Improper Deportation of Legal Permanent Residents: 
The U.S. Government’s Mischaracterization of the Supreme Court’s Decision in Nijhawan v. 
Holder, 15 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 1, 12 (2013); Cam Barker et al., United States Supreme Court 
Update, 26 APP. ADVOC. 72, 77 (2013). 
171 Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285; see also Mario K. Castillo, Immigration Consequences: 
A Primer for Texas Criminal Defense Attorneys in Light of Padilla v. Kentucky, 63 BAYLOR 
L. REV. 587, 607 (2011); Nelson A. Vargas-Padilla, The Immigration Consequences of 
Criminal Conduct, 3 CRIM. L. BRIEF 24, 25 (2007). 
172 Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285; Tokatly v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 613, 620 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(“[W]hen it is not clear from the statutory definition of the prior offense whether that offense 
constitutes a removable offense . . . we apply a ‘modified’ categorical approach under which 
we may look beyond the language of the statute to a narrow, specified set of documents that 
are part of the record of conviction, including ‘the indictment, the judgment of conviction, jury 
instructions, a signed guilty plea, or the transcript from the plea proceedings.’” (quoting United 
States v. Rivera-Sanchez, 247 F.3d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc))). 
173 Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256–57. 
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indivisible.174 As Justice Breyer alluded to,175 this may make sense in an 
abstract sense, but—like much of the previous lower court decisions in this 
area—in practice it may lead to more confusion and misapplication at federal 
sentencing or removal proceedings. In this sense, Justice Alito’s dissent 
could, in the end, serve as a template for overruling these cases and instead 
impose a “real-world [and practical] approach [to] avoid the mess” created 
by these lines of cases.176 
CONCLUSION 
In this area of statutory interpretation, the Court’s decisions have all 
started with good intentions. They have all attempted to balance the 
requirements of the ACCA and other federal statutes with the protections 
afforded by the statutory text, other court precedent and the Constitution 
itself.177 However, each Court opinion has left the lower courts scratching 
their heads in attempts to figure out which approach — categorical or 
modified categorical—is appropriate. Mathis has already been cited by a few 
different circuits, with somewhat inconsistent results.178 Time will tell if the 
Court will have to address this issue again and whether it will attempt to 
resolve further ambiguities, or, as Justice Alito suggested, scrap it, turn the 
car around, and start all over again at the beginning. 
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177 See id. at 2259–60 (Thomas, J. concurring) (arguing that “depending on judge-found 
facts in Armed Career Criminal Act [] cases violates the Sixth Amendment and is 
irreconcilable with Apprendi [v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 468 (2000)]”). 
178 Compare United States v. Edwards, 836 F.3d 831, 833 (7th Cir. 2016) (“recourse to 
state-court charging documents was improper” when answer to the question was on the 
statute’s face) with United States v. Henderson, No. 15-1562, 2016 WL 6595945, at *6–7 (3d 
Cir. Nov. 8, 2016) (proper for sentencing court to look at charging documents even if state’s 
own interpretation and the face of the statute confirm the statute lists elements and not means). 
